Abstract-In the model of perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) schemes, there are n channels between a sender and a receiver. An infinitely powerful adversary A may corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through t out of n channels. The sender wishes to send a secret s to the receiver perfectly privately and perfectly reliably without sharing any key with the receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N the model of ( -round, -channel) message transmission schemes [2] , there are channels between a sender and a receiver. An infinitely powerful adversary may corrupt (observe and forge) the messages sent through out of channels. The sender wishes to send a secret to the receiver in -rounds without sharing any key with the receiver.
We say that a message transmission scheme is perfectly secure if it satisfies perfect privacy and perfect reliability. The perfect privacy means that the adversary learns no information on , and the perfect reliability means that the receiver can output correctly. For , Dolev et al. showed that there exists a -round perfectly secure message transmission scheme (PSMT) if and only if [2] . They also showed an efficient -round PSMT [2] . For , it is known that there exists a -round PSMT if and only if [2] . However, it is very difficult to construct an efficient scheme for . Dolev et al. [2] showed a -round PSMT such that the transmission rate is , where the transmission rate is defined as the total number of bits transmitted the size of the secrets Sayeed et al. [11] showed a -round PSMT such that the transmission rate is . Recently, Srinathan et al. showed that is a lower bound on the transmission rate of -round PSMT [14] . Then Agarwal, Cramer and de Haan [1] showed a -round PSMT such that the transmission rate is at CRYPTO 2006 based on the work of Srinathan et al. [14] . 1 However, the communication complexity is exponential because the sender must broadcast consistency check vectors of size 2 In other words, Agarwal et al. [1] achieved the transmission rate of by sending exponentially many secrets. Therefore, the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both exponential. Indeed, the authors wrote [1, Sec.6]that:
"We do not know whether a similar protocol can exist where sender and receiver restricted to polynomial time (in terms of the number of channels ) only".
In this paper, we solve this open problem. That is, we show the first -round PSMT for such that not only the transmission rate is but also the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
The main novelty of our approach is to introduce a notion of pseudobasis to the coding theory. Let be a linear code of length over a finite field with the minimum Hamming distance . Consider a message transmission scheme such that the sender chooses a codeword of randomly and sends through channel for . Note that the receiver can detect errors, but cannot correct them because . If the sender sends many codewords, however, then we can do something better. Suppose that the sender sent as shown above, and the receiver received for , where is an error vector caused by the adversary. We now 1 By using this algorithm, we first show a -round PSMT for such that the transmission rate is and the computational cost of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in . (See Fig. 4 .) Then combining the technique of [1] , [14] , we show a -round PSMT such that not only the transmission rate is but also the computational cost of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
Remark: This paper is a revised version of [9] . First the protocol shown in [9, Sec.5.1] has a flaw as follows. At the footnote of [9, p. 336 ] , it was claimed that " is the number of channels that the adversary forged on ". However, is the pseudodimension as defined at Step 2-1. Hence the protocol does not work as claimed in Section VI. In this paper, we correct this flaw. That is, we show a corrected protocol in Section V-A, and completely change Section VI accordingly.
The next problem comes from the fact that we cannot write a received word as uniquely if a linear code has the minimum Hamming distance only , where is a codeword and is an error vector with the Hamming weight or less. Hence the relationship between the pseudobasis and a basis which spans the error-vector space was not clear in [9] . In this paper, we show a clear relationship between a pseudobasis and a basis which spans any admissible error-vector space. See Section II-C for the details. [8] . However, the computational cost of the receiver is exponential in . Then Srinathan et al. showed a polynomial time algorithm in [13] .
Garay and Ostrovsky considered a model such that there is an authenticated channel in addition to channels between the sender and the receiver [5] . For this model, they showed an almost secure protocol such that adversaries can corrupt at most out of the channels. Finally, our adversary is called a threshold adversary because she can corrupt up to out of channels. Hirt and Maurer introduced a more general adversary structure model for secure multiparty computation [6] . In this model for PSMT, an adversary is characerized by a family of channels that she can corrupt. In particular, adversary model is a generalization of , and adversary model is a generalization of . Kumar et al. [7] showed that the adversary model is necessary and sufficient to realize a (multi-round) PSMT. Desmedt et al. [3] showed that the adversary model is necessary and sufficient to realize a single round PSMT.
II. MAIN IDEA
A. Basics
Suppose that there are channels between the sender and the receiver, and an adversary may corrupt out of channels. We use to denote GF , where is a prime such that . 3 Let be a linear code of length such that a codeword is , where is a polynomial over F with . Note that is a Reed-Solomon code with the minimum Hamming distance . This is because has at most zeros.
It is also known that Shamir's -threshold secret sharing scheme [12] is equivalent to the above Reed-Solomon code [10] . In the distribution phase of Shamir's -threshold secret sharing scheme, a dealer chooses a random polynomial for a secret , and compute as shares. In the reconstruction phase,
• is uniquely determined from any out of shares;
• no information on is obtained from any out of shares. This is because has coefficients which are randomly chosen.
B. Difference From Random Errors
Consider a message transmission scheme such that the sender chooses a codeword of randomly, and sends through channel for . Then the adversary learns no information on even if she observes channels (see Section II-A). Thus, perfect privacy is satisfied.
If , then the minimum Hamming distance of is . Hence the receiver can correct errors caused by the adversary. Thus perfect reliability is also satisfied. Therefore we can obtain a -round PSMT easily.
If , however, the minimum Hamming distance of is . Hence the receiver can only detect errors, but cannot correct them. This is the main reason why the construction of PSMT for is difficult. What is a difference between usual error correction and PSMTs ? If the sender sends a single codeword only, then the adversary causes errors randomly. Hence there is no difference. If the sender sends many codewords , however, the errors are not totally random. This is because the errors always occur at the same (or less) places! To see this more precisely, suppose that the receiver received (1) where is an error vector caused by the adversary. Define support Then there exist some -subset of channels such that each error vector satisfies support (2) where is the set of channels that the adversary forged.
This means that the space spanned by has dimension at most . We will exploit this fact extensively.
C. Pseudobasis and Pseudodimension
For
, suppose that the receiver received such that (3) where is a codeword that the sender sent and is the error vector caused by the adversary. We say that is the real error-vector set of . We also say that is the real error-vector space if it is spanned by the real error-vector set . For two vectors and , we write if . In particular, (3) means that Let be a set of received words. We say that is an admissible error-vector set of if each satisfies for some codeword , and support (
We say that is an admissible error-vector space of if it is spanned by an admissible error-vector set . For given , an admissible error-vector set may not be unique. Nevertheless, the following results holds for any admisible error-vector set.
We begin with a definition of linearly pseudoexpress. We next define pseudospan.
Definition 2:
We say that pseudospans if each can be written as for some . We then define a pseudobasis and the pseudodimension of .
Definition 3:
• We say that is a pseudobasis of if it is a minimum set which pseudospans .
• Suppose that is a pseudobasis of , where . Then we say that has the pseudodimension .
Theorem 1:
Let be an admissible error-vector set of . Then is a basis of the admisible error-vector space if and only if is a pseudobasis of . (Note that and have the same indices.) In particular, the pseudodimension of is equal to the dimension of .
Proof: Suppose that is a basis of . That is, is a minimum set which spans . Since spans , pseudospans from Lemma 1. Suppose that is not minimum. That is, suppose that there exists a smaller subset of which pseudospans . Then the corresponding subset of also spans from Lemma 1. However, this contradcits to the fact that is minimum. Hence is minimum. This shows that is a pseudobasis of .
Similarly, is a basis of if is a pseudobasis of . Hnece the pseudodimension of is equal to the dimension of .
Since the real error-vector set is an admisible error-vector set, we obtain the following corollary. 
support (7) where (5) comes from the definition of , (6) holds because is a basis and (7) holds because . The following theorem is clear since the adversary forges at most channels.
Theorem 2:
The pseudodimension of is at most .
Proof: The dimension of the real error-vector space is at most because the adversary forges at most channels. Hence from Theorem 1, The pseudodimension of is at most .
D. How to Find Pseudobasis
In this subsection, we show a polynomial time algorithm which finds the pseudodimension and a pseudobasis of . Theorem 1 shows that is a pseudobasis of if and only if is a basis of an admisible error-vector space , where is the admissible error-vector set. On the other hand, we can find a basis of a vector space easily by using a greedy algorithm as shown in Fig. 1 . This means that a pseudobasis can be found by using a similar greedy algorithm. Remember that is linearly pseudoexpressed by if there exists some such that
Then it is clear that is a linear expression of from (8) .
In Fig. 2 Fig. 3 , we show a polynomial time algorithm which finds the pseudodimension and a pseudobasis of . Note that Fig. 3 is almost the same as Fig. 1 . Indeed, it is obtained by replacing of Fig. 1 with . We call the algorithm of Fig. 1 the real-basis finding algorithm, and call the algorithm of Fig. 3 the pseudobasis finding algorithm.
Let be an admissble error-vector set of , and let be the vector space spanned by . Supppose that we apply the real-basis finding algorithm to , and apply the pseudobasis finding algorithm to . The real-basis finding algorithm outputs a basis of . We will show that the pseudobasis finding algorithm outputs a pseudobasis of . Fig. 4 . Our 3-round PSMT for n = 2t + 1.
Step 2(a) is the only difference between the two algorithms. Further from Lemma 1, is added to at step 2(a) if and only if is added to at step 2(a). Hence the pseudobasis finding algorithm behaves in the same way as the real-basis finding algorithm. In particular, if the real-basis finding algorithm outputs , then the pseudobasis finding algorithm outputs . Therefore is a pseudobasis of from Theorem 1 because is a basis of .
E. Broadcast
We say that a sender (receiver) broadcasts if it she sends over all channels. Since the adversary corrupts at most out of channels, the receiver (sender) receives correctly from at least channels. Therefore, the receiver (sender) can accept correctly by taking the majority vote.
F. How to Apply to -Round PSMT
We now present an efficient -round PSMT for in Fig. 4 .
Further by combining the technique of [1] , [14] , we can construct a -round PSMT such that not only the transmission rate is , but also the computational cost of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in . The details will be given in Sections III-VI.
III. DETAILS OF OUR -ROUND PSMT
In this section, we describe the details of our -round PSMT for which was outlined in Section II-F, and prove its security. We also show that the transmission rate is and the computational cost of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
Remember that is the set of all channels which the adversary forged, and "broadcast" is defined in Section II-E.
A. -Round Protocol for
The sender wishes to send secrets to the receiver.
Step 1) The sender does the following for . 1) She chooses a polynomial over such that randomly. Let . 2) She send through channel for . The receiver then receives , where is the error vector caused by the adversary.
Step 2) The receiver does the following. 1) Find the pseudodimension and a pseudobasis of by using the algorithm of Fig. 3 . 2) Broadcast , and . where is the set of indices of .
Step 3) The sender does the following. 1) Construct of (7) 
B. Security
We first prove the perfect privacy. Consider such that . For such , is not broadcast at step 2-2. Hence the adversary observes at most elements of . This means that she has no information on because . Therefore since is used as the key of onetime-pad, the adversary learns no information on . We next prove the perfect reliability. We first show that there exist indices such that This is because from Theorem 2. We next show that for each at Step 4. This is because for all , and
Also note that and . Therefore for .
C. Efficiency
Let denote the bit length of the field elements. Let denote the communication complexity of Step for . Then since . Hence the total communication complexity is . Further the sender sends secrets . Therefore, the transmission rate is because It is easy to see that the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
IV. OUR BASIC -ROUND PSMT
In this section, we show our basic -round PSMT for such that the transmission rate is and the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
For two vectors and , define
Remember that is the set of all such that .
A. Randomness Extractor
Suppose that the adversary has no information on out of random elements . In this case, let be a polynomial with such that for . Then it is well known [1, Sec.2.4] that the adversary has no information on
B. Basic -Round Protocol
The sender wishes to send a secret to the receiver.
Step 1) The receiver does the following for . 1) He chooses a random polynomial such that . 2) He sends through channel , and the sender receives 3) Through each channel , he sends and the sender receives where is the error caused by the adversary. Let
Step 2) The sender does the following.
1) For , a) If or or , then broadcast "ignore channel ". 4 This channel will be ignored from now on because it is forged clearly. b) Else define as 
C. Security
We first prove the perfect privacy.
Lemma 2:
There is at least one on which the adversary has no information.
Proof: Consider a noncorrupted channel such that . First the sender does not broadcast at step 2-4 because . Next because is sent through channel that the adversary does not corrupt, we have Further the adversary observes at most values of . Hence the adversary has no information on because . Finally there exists at least one noncorrupted channel such that because Therefore, the adversary has no information on from Section IV-A. Hence she learns no information on from . We next prove the perfect reliability. If and , then from the definition of . Therefore, at step 3-2, for all , and for all such that and . This means that for each , where
Further since and , it holds that
In particular, . Therefore from (9), we have that for each . Hence we obtain that because and . Consequently, Thus the receiver can compute correctly.
2 3 " at step 2-2 and step 3-3.
D. Efficiency
Let denote the communication complexity of Step for . Note that for each . Then because . Hence the total communication complexity is . The transmission rate is because the sender sends one secret.
It is easy to see that the computational cost of the sender and the receiver are polynomial in .
V. MORE EFFICIENT -ROUND PROTOCOL
In our basic -round protocol, the sender sends a single secret. In this section, we show a more efficient -round protocol such that the sender sends secrets by running the basic protocol times in parallel. This implies that we can reduce the transmission rate from to .
A. Protocol
Step 1) The receiver does the following for each channel .
For ; 1) He chooses a random polynomial such that . 2) He sends through channel , and the sender receives 3) Through each channel , he sends and the sender receives where is the error caused by the adversary. Let
Step 2) The sender does the following. 1) Find the pseudodimension and a pseudobasis of by using the algorithm of Fig. 3 . Broadcast and .
2) For , a) If or or for some , then broadcast "ignore channel ". 6 This channel will be ignored from now on because it is forged clearly. b) Else define as 
B. Security
Lemma 3:
There exists a subset such that and the adversary has no information on . Proof: Consider a noncorrupted channel such that . First the sender does not broadcast at step 2-1 because . Next since is sent through channel that the adversary does not corrupt, we have Further the adversary observes at most values of . Hence the adversary has no information on because . Note that the adversary corrupts at most channels and for each corrupted channel , the adversary gets 6 For simplicity, we assume that there are no such channels in what follows. 7 "for each i + hn" can be replaced by "for each i + hn = 2 3 " at step 2-3
and step 3-3.
. Therefore, there exists a subset such that and the adversary has no information on . Finally Therefore, the adversary has no information on from Section IV-A. Hence she learns no information on for . We next prove the perfect reliability. , and the transmission rate is because the sender sends secrets.
It is easy to see that the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
VI. FINAL -ROUND PSMT
The transmission rate is still in the -round PSMT shown in Section V. In this section, we show how to reduce it to by using the technique of [1, p. 406] and [14] . Then we can obtain the first -round PSMT for such that not only the transmission rate is but also the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
A. Generalized Broadcast
Suppose that the receiver knows the locations of channels that the adversary forged, and the sender knows the value of . For example, suppose that the receiver knows that channels are forged. Note that the adversary can corrupt at most channels among the remaining channels . In this case, it is well known that the sender can send field elements reliably with the communication complexity as follows. 1) The sender finds a polynomial with such that . 2) She sends through channel for . Without loss of generality, suppose that the receiver knows that channels are forged by the adversary. Then he consider a shortened code such that a codeword is . The minimum Hamming distance of this code is . Hence the receiver can correct the remaining errors. This means that the receiver can decode correctly. Then he can reconstruct by using Lagrange formula because Therefore he can obtain correctly.
B. Matching of Graph
Let be the undirected simple graph with the vertex set and the edge set . A matching of the graph is an edge set such that no two edges in are connected. A matching is said to be maximal if there is no matching such that . We can find a maximal matching of easily (in polynomial time) by using a greedy algorithm as follows.
1) Let
. 2) For each edge in , do:
If is not connected to any edge in , then add to . 3) Output .
Definition 4: For a vertex
, let denote the number of edges which are connected to . Define
We then say that be the maximum degree of the graph . [14] , a maximum matching was used. Instead we use a maximal matching because it is sufficient for our purpose, and it is easier to find a maximal matching than a maximum matching.
C. How to Improve Step 2-5
In the -round PSMT shown in Section V, step 2-5 is the most expensive part, where the sender broadcasts and for each . In this subsection, we will show a method which reduces the communication complexity of step 2-5 from to . We modify step 2-5 as follows.
Step 2. The sender does the following. Hence the sender can send field elements reliably with the communication complexity by using the generalized broadcasting (see Section VI-A).
Next from Theorem 3, we obtain that because for all from step 2-2(a). Further it is easy to see that Therefore, for each , the sender can send and to the receiver reliably with the communication complexity by using generalized broadcasting. For all , the communication complexity is . This means that the sender can send all and reliably with the communication complexity .
D. Final Efficiency
Consequently, we obtain because the communication complexity of step 2-5' is now reduced to . On the other hand, from Section V-C. To summarize, and in our final -round PSMT. Hence, the total communication complexity is because . Now the transmission rate is because the sender sends secrets which is . Finally, it is easy to see that the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed the first -round PSMT for such that not only the transmission rate is but also the computational costs of the sender and the receiver are both polynomial in . The main novelty of our approach is to introduce a notion of pseudobasis to the coding theory.
In our protocol, the sender has to send secrets to achieve the transmission rate .
It is an open problem whether we can reduce the number of the secrets or not.
